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I. Introduction 
The Internal Revenue Code and Regulations use the concept of 
"fair market value" to place a monetary value on economic benefits 
received or paid in a form other than cash. Fair market value is both 
the measure of income for the receipt of property' and the measure of 
deductions for losses2 or payments in the form of property.3 In the 
estate and gift tax area, fair market value is the measure of property 
included in a decedent's estate4 and the measure of a gift of property in 
a lifetime transfer. 5 
The fair market value of property is generally defmed as "the price 
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and 
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and 
t Citation to tax cases includes parallel cites to United States Tax Cases and American 
Federal Tax Reports to facilitate source location by tax practitioners. All references to the Code 
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated, and all 
references to Regulations are to the Treasury Regulations issued thereunder. 
• Professor in Residence, Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service; Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B. 1968, University of Rochester; J.D. 1971, 
Harvard University. This Article was prepared before the author became Professor in Residence, 
and the views expressed are those of the author, not the Internal Revenue Service. The author is 
indebted to David I. Salem, a student at the University of Maryland School of Law, for his re-
search assistance. 
I. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(l), T.D. 6696, 1963-2 C.B. 23, T.D. 6856, 1965-2 C.B. 30, T.D. 
6888, 1966-2 C.B. 23, T.D. 7554, 1978-2 C.B. 71, T.D. 7623, 1979-1 C.B. 66. See i'!fra text accom-
panying notes 25-53. 
2. See i'!fra text accompanying notes 91-106. 
3. See i'!fra text accompanying notes 81-90 (business deductions) & 107-64 (charitable con-
tribution deductions). 
4. See i'!fra text accompanying notes 54-80. 
5. Id. 
833 
HeinOnline -- 60 Tex. L. Rev. 834 1981-1982
Texas Law Review Vol. 60:833, 1982 
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."6 This definition, 
however, fails to resolve the fair market value issue in many cases. 
Value may depend on the identities of the buyer and seller as well as on 
what they intend to do with the property being valued. The same piece 
of property may change hands at different prices, depending on the 
market in which it is sold. For example, an article of tangible personal 
property that costs $5.00 to make may be sold by a manufacturer to a 
wholesaler for $10.00. The wholesaler may in turn sell it to a retailer 
for $15.00, who may sell it to his retail customer for $20.00. The same 
property may be sold back to the retailer for $14.00 and then resold to a 
second retail customer for $20.00. 
Even though all of the above transactions were at arm's length and 
involved willing buyers and willing sellers, they involved several sales 
prices. The price differential can be attributed to the market in which 
each sale took place. Therefore, a determination of fair market value 
under the willing buyer/willing seller test cannot be made without first 
knowing the market in which the transaction will take place. 
Separate and distinct markets exist for certain kinds of property, 
but most taxpayers generally have access to only one of those markets. 
A casual purchaser of personal property typically has access only to the 
retail market. The typical customer purchases property from a dealer 
who receives a normal retail markup.7 Similarly, a casual seller of per-
6. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-l(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6684, 1963-2 C.B. 411, T.D. 
6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367. 
See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546,551,31 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 147,832, at 73-1462 
to -1463,73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 12,926, at 81,311 (1973). See also Amerada Hess Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 83, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 75-702, at 75-1542, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 9480, at 87,271 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Harrison v. United 
States, 475 F. Supp. 408, 415, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 79-5148, at 79-5426 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affd, 
620 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1980); Estate of Doelle v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 78-5091, at 
78-5307, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9480, at 84,518 (D.C. Mich. 1978); Scher v. United States, 39 
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 148,128, at 77-1581 (D.N.J. 1977); Estate of McNary v. Commissioner, 47 
T.C. 467, 470 (1967); Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934, 937, 13 A.F.T.R.2d ~ 146,506, at 
1809, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 12,206, at 92,381 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 
(1964); Bader v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 883, 886, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 59-575, at 1222, 59-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9431, at 72,112 (S.D. Ill. 1959); Duncan Indus. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 
266,276 (1979); Estate of Guggenheim v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 251,292 (1939), mod!fied sub. 
nom. Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1941). 
See generally Alfred, Fair Market Value Concept-General Considerations, 14 WEST. RES. L. 
REV. 173 (1963); Braitman, The Eye of the Beholder: A Fresh Look at Fair Market Value, 52 
TAXES 269 (1974); Gorden, What is Fair Market Value?, 8 TAX L. REv. 35 (1952); Note, Cart-
wright v. United States: The Clear Ring of Common Sense, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 643 (1974); 
Note, Federal Estate and G!fi Taxation: Amended Regulations Change Valuation for Estate and G!fi 
Taxes, 1966 DuKE L.J. 248. 
7. The retail markup of the dealer represents the spread between the retail and the whole-
sale prices. The spread is not necessarily all profit to the dealer. The dealer may have substantial 
carrying, rent, sales, advertising, and other costs. These costs associated with the sale of personal 
property may be high; therefore, the markup charged by the dealer may be high. 
834 
HeinOnline -- 60 Tex. L. Rev. 835 1981-1982
Fair Market Value in Tax Law 
sonal property usually has access only to the wholesale market. In 
some situations he may be completely excluded from selling in the re-
tail market because of barriers to entry.8 Therefore, he must sell his 
property to a dealer. 
The fair market value issue arises in the context of valuing prop-
erty in the hands of a particular taxpayer. The determination of fair 
market value can be divided into two distinct inquiries. First, is fair 
market value the amount it would cost a similarly situated taxpayer to 
purchase the property-the so-called "replacement value"9-or the 
amount that the taxpayer would realize on the sale of such property-
the so-called "liquidation value"?10 Second, what value should be cho-
sen among the range of prices available under the appropriate stand-
ard, whether liquidation or replacement value? 
In general, the courts have used replacement value as the proper 
measure of fair market value. Although both the courts and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service have departed at times from the replacement 
value rule, and have adopted liquidation value as the appropriate 
measure of fair market value, they have not articulated a consistent 
theory for justifying this departure. Thus, there is little guidance for 
determining fair market value in the tax law. 
This Article sets forth a new approach for determining whether 
replacement value or liquidation value is the appropriate measure of 
fair market value. The proposed approach is based on the conclusion 
that the standard for determining fair market value should not be 
mechanically applied to all areas of the tax law. This Article sets forth 
guidelines for a flexible approach to the determination of fair market 
value. This approach is applied to five areas of taxation: (1) income 
inclusion, (2) estate and gift valuation, (3) business deductions, ( 4) loss 
8. A new electric com popper, for example, may not be marketable at retail by an individ-
ual because it does not have an unopened container, a condition that does not affect the com 
popper itself. Even if the casual seller can meet these threshold market entry barriers, he generally 
cannot engage in a transaction with a casual purchaser without a substantial amount of effort. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 117-20 (describing replacement value). See, e.g., 
Green v. United States, 460 F.2d 412, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) f72-598, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
f9429 (5th Cir. 1972) (mineral interests); Tuttle v. United States, 436 F.2d 69, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-
H) f71-313, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f9140 (2d Cir. 1970) (life insurance). 
10. ·see infra text accompanying notes 121-23 (describing liquidation value). See, e.g., Ivan 
Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) f 75-5073, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) 'l 9557 (1975) (value of securities for purposes of determining accumulation beyond the 
reasonable needs of the business viewed as net realizable value, i.e., liquidation value); Hicks v. 
United States, 486 F.2d 325, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) f147,867, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f12,958 
{lOth Cir. 1973) (liquidation value rather than book value used to determine real estate holdings 
of a corporation for estate tax purposes); Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925, 28 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 866, 
42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f10,127 (1st Cir. 1942) (stock); Estate of Huntington v. Commissioner, 
36 B.T.A. 698 (1937); Estate of Weingarten v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 249 (1928). 
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valuation, and (5) charitable contribution deductions. The proposed 
approach is contrasted with that of the IRS in the areas of charitable 
contributions and valuation abuses. The Article also suggests a method 
to determine appropriate value once the standard has been chosen, and 
concludes that the proposed test for determining fair market value is 
consistent with existing tax principles as well as with the policies under-
lying the law. 
II. A Flexible Approach to Fair Market Valuation 
The standard for determining fair market value-whether replace-
ment or liquidation value-should further the purpose of the particular 
statutory provision that requires the valuation. The standard, there-
fore, must vary with the purpose underlying the provision under con-
sideration. A flexible definition of fair market value assures that the 
relevant provisions of the tax law accomplish their objectives. 
The proposed approach to fair market valuation is based upon two 
general principles that look to the ownership of the property at the time 
of valuation to determine whether replacement value or liquidation 
value is appropriate: 
(1) Replacement value is generally the proper method of valua-
tion when the taxpayer (or his estate or beneficiary) retains the 
property after the transaction that gives rise to the need for 
valuation. 
(2) Liquidation value is the proper measure of valuation when 
the taxpayer (or his estate or beneficiary) does not retain the 
property. 
These principles are derived by viewing transactions in property as 
a series of cash transactions. The transfer of property may be charac-
terized in one of two ways: If the taxpayer possesses the property at the 
conclusion of the transaction, it may be viewed as a transfer of cash 
followed by a purchase of the property; if the taxpayer does not possess 
the property, it may be viewed as a sale of the property for cash fol-
lowed by disposition of the sales proceeds. Under either characteriza-
tion, the amount of cash that would substitute for the property in the 
transaction and leave the taxpayer in the same economic position that 
he is in after the transaction is the measure of fair market value of the 
property. 
The two-transaction approach is supported generally by case law. 
In United States v. General Shoe Corp. , for example, a corporation 
made a contribution of appreciated realty to an employee's pension 
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trust. 11 The court held that the corporation was entitled to a deduction 
equal to the fair market value of the property. 12 The court also found 
that the corporation had realized taxable gain in the amount of the 
excess of the fair market value of the realty over its basis. 13 The corpo-
ration was treated as if it had sold the real estate for cash in the amount 
of its fair market value and contributed the proceeds to the trust. 14 
Several decisions have adopted the arm's length exchange rationale of 
General Shoe .15 
The proposed approach results in the application of a variant 
standard-replacement value or liquidation value-to defme the single 
concept of fair market value. Such a variant defmition of terms has 
substantial precedent in the tax law. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. 
v. United States 16 demonstrates that a concept in the Code may be 
given two separate meanings in order to accomplish the underlying 
purpose of the section under consideration. In Philadelphia Park, the 
court had to determine the "cost" of property received in exchange for 
other property in order to determine the basis of the acquired prop-
ertyY In cash acquisitions, the cost of the property is the amount of 
cash paid for it. 18 The court held, however, that the cost of the prop-
erty acquired in this exchange was its fair market value, rather than the 
fair market value of the property surrendered. 19 The court interpreted 
the tax concept of "cost" in a way that would achieve the purpose of 
the Code provision.20 This approach was necessary to ensure that gain 
taxed at the time it was realized would not be taxed again.21 
A similar interpretation of technical tax concepts that is oriented 
11. 282 F.2d 9, 6 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 60-5133, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9678 (6th Cir. 
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). 
12. /d. at 13, 6 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5473, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 77,862. 
13. /d. at 12, 6 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5472-73, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 77,861-62. 
14. /d. at 11-12, 6 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5472, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 77,861. 
15. See, e.g., Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992, 994, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 68-
538, at 1284,68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9366, at 86,975 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Withers v. Commissioner, 
69 T.C. 900 (1978). See also International Freighting Corp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 
313-14, 30 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1433, 1436, 43-1 tf.s. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9334, at 9496 (2d Cir. 1943). 
16. 126 F. Supp. 184, 46 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1293, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9697 (Ct. Cl. 
1954). 
17. /d. at 187, 46 A.F.T.R. (P-H) at 1296, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 46,910. 
18. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). 
19. 126 F. Supp. at 189, 46 A.F.T.R. (P-H) at 1298, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 46,911. 
20. /d. at 188, 46 A.F.T.R. (P-H) at 1297, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 46,910-11. 
21. The principle of interpreting terms in accordance with the context in which they appear, 
even though this may produce several interpretations of a single term, also was accepted by the 
Supreme Court in Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H)~ 1453, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
~ 736 (1931). Burnet involved the question of when the value of a promise of future payment 
could be ascertained in order to determine the tax consequences of its receipt. The Supreme Court 
required valuation of the promise for purposes of determining the amount included in an estate, 
but refused to value the promise to compute the amount of income reportable on its receipt. 
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to the purpose of the provision can be found in the estate tax and chari-
table contributions contexts. In the estate tax area the phrase "time of 
[decedent's] death" has been given different meanings to correspond to 
the various purposes underlying each Code section. Courts have inter-
preted the phrase to mean "immediately after the decedent's death" for 
purposes of section 2031,22 and "immediately before the decedent's 
death" for purposes of section 2033.23 In the charitable contribution 
area, one court has accepted the view that the appropriate measure of 
valuation can vary with the context in which the valuation issue arises, 
and that valuation for gift tax purposes can be made according to a 
standard different from that used for valuation for charitable contribu-
tion purposes. 24 
Tax concepts must be interpreted in a flexible manner in order to 
Instead, the Court allowed the transaction to remain open so that the taxpayer reported the in-
come as proceeds were received on the promise. 
The crux of this decision was the recognition that estate tax collection and income tax collec-
tion involve different problems for the government. For estate tax purposes a determination had 
to be made at the time of the decedent's death; if the tax were not collected at that time, it would 
never be collected. For income tax purposes, however, a determination could await further devel-
opments. Tax not collected from the seller at the time of the sale could be collected later, when 
the proceeds of the sale were received. See id. at 413-14, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) at 1455, 2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) at 243. 
22. Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264,51 A.F.T.R. (P-H)~ 67, 57-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 
I 1,687 (3d Cir. 1957). The court in Goodman defined time of death as immediately after death for 
§ 203 I valuation purposes, because the tax should measure the value of the assets transferred to 
beneficiaries by reason of the decedent's death. /d. at 268-69, 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) at 72, 57-I U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) at 57,687. In that case the executor sought to value the decedent's right to receive 
payments for a certain time period, contingent upon his fulfilling his duties and not engaging in a 
competing business after leaving his employment. These contingencies existed immediately 
before the decedent's death. The court, however, held that the value of the rights should not 
consider the contingencies existing prior to death, because the rights should be valued at the point 
immediately after the decedent's life had ended. 
23. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 465 F.2d 760, 30 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 
147,694, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 12,875 (2d Cir. 1972). The court in Connecticut Bank inter-
preted the phrase to mean "immediately before the decedent's death" for inclusion purposes 
under § 2033. Therefore, the amounts received under the Connecticut wrongful death statute 
were not includible in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes because the dece-
dent never had any right to these amounts, which could not pass from him at his death. Under the 
statute, the decedent could not possess a property interest in the cause of action before his death. 
The Internal Revenue Service has accepted the holding of this decision. See Rev. Rul. 75-
127, 1975-1 C. B. 297. See also Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 C.B. 219; Rev. Rul. 68-88, 1968-1 C. B. 397. 
24. Tuttle v. United States, 436 F.2d 69, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 71-313, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 9140 (2d Cir. 1970). The court permitted a deduction for a charitable contribution of a 
life insurance policy in the amount of its liquidation value rather than its replacement value, even 
though it acknowledged that the replacement value would have been the appropriate measure for 
gift tax purposes. 
Although the court was correct in applying a purpose oriented analysis, its opinion reflects 
confusion in the rationale. The court apparently considered the subjective value to the donee as 
an indicia of value for tax purposes. The charitable organization that received the life insurance 
sold it shortly after receipt, and the court used this liquidation value as the amount of the deduc-
tion for the taxpayer. The court noted that if the donee had held the policies for investment, it 
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advance the legislative objectives underlying the Code provision in 
question. The mechanical approach that otherwise results gives tax-
payers the opportunity to circumvent the purpose of the statute. The 
approach proposed in this Article creates distinct guidelines, yet it pre-
vents the inadequacies of a single, rigid definition. 
III. Application of the Proposed Approach to Fair Market Value 
Determination 
A. Fair Market Valuation of Income 
1. Existing State of the Law. -A taxpayer who receives property 
as an item of income must include its fair market value in his gross 
income.25 The objective of this provision is to ensure that a taxpayer 
who has received an economic benefit pays tax on the resulting enrich-
ment.26 The fair market value of the property received is the measure 
of enrichment. 
Normally, the replacement value of the property received is the 
proper measure of enrichment. It accurately measures the value of the 
acquired property because the taxpayer has avoided payment of that 
amount by receiving the property in kind. The Treasury Department 
has adopted the replacement value position in several revenue rulings27 
and in a discussion draft of proposed income tax regulations on fringe 
benefits.28 Not all courts, however, have looked to replacement value 
might have required the use of replacement value as the appropriate means of valuation. Id at 
72, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 71-356, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 85,651. 
The court's analysis may be interpreted to mean that orie must look to the subjective value of 
property in determining its fair market value, and that subjective value may differ depending 
upon whether the case arises in a gift tax, estate tax, or income tax situation. The more probable 
interpretation, however, limits the opinion to life insurance policies, which, in general, do not have 
a ready market for sale. The weakness in the court's opinion results from the failure to under-
stand that the difference between replacement value and liquidation value is not a subjective 
concept depending upon the method of transfer. The difference results because of the market-
place circumstances of the donor. Insurance companies sell insurance policies at a price that 
includes the agent's commission and a reasonable profit. That policy's cash surrender value, on 
the other hand, represents simply the savings account feature in the life insurance policy-its 
wholesale value without the insurance company's retail markup. The court should have decided 
the legal approach for valuing the property without relying on the subjective elements of the 
transaction, possibly peculiar to life insurance. 
25. The regulations provide that property or services received in payment of services are 
includible in the recipient's income at the fair market value of the property or services. Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.61-2(d)(l), T.D. 6696, 1963-2 C.B. 23, T.D. 6856, 1965-2 C.B. 30, T.D. 6888, 1966-2 C.B. 
23, T.D. 7554, 1978-2 C.B. 71, T.D. 7623, 1979-1 C.B. 66. 
26. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 45 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1352, 55-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'i 9308 (1955). 
27. See Rev. RuL 80-322, 1980-2 C.B. 36 (fair market value of business suits received by 
employee includible in income over years for which they were available to him). See also Rev. 
Rul. 58-347, 1958-2 C.B. 878 (fair market value of prizes awarded on a television show). 
28. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.61-20 (discussion draft). See infra note 168. 
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as the appropriate measure of the fair market value of property in-
cluded in income. 
Replacement value is generally adopted in cases in which the tax-
payer receives either compensation in kind29 or a taxable prize.30 In 
Ireland v. United States,3I for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a 
taxpayer using a company airplane for commuting purposes must in-
clude the fair market value of the flights in his income.32 The court 
measured the fair market value of the flights by looking to the cost of 
comparable charter flights.33 The staff of the Joint Committee on In-
ternal Revenue Taxation reached a similar conclusion in examining 
former President Nixon's tax returns for the years 1969 through 1972. 
The staff concluded that the President received income from his fam-
ily's use of government planes for nonbusiness purposes.34 In valuing 
those flights, however, the staff used the price of first class commercial 
flights rather than the price of charter flights, because security precau-
tions, rather than the convenience of the family, necessitated the use of 
presidential aircraft. Js 
Courts have departed from the use of replacement value in the 
29. See, e.g., Bardahl Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 1245 
(1960) (employee had income from the use of a company automobile in the amount of the vehi-
cle's fair rental value rather than merely the car's operating costs to the company, although tax-
payer conceded rental value to be equal to the depreciation on the car for one year). See also, e.g., 
McDonald v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 223 (1976) (an employee who received housing abroad 
which did not quality for exclusion under I.R.C. § 119 must include the fair market value of that 
lodging in income, even though the accommodations were more expensive than indigenous 
housing). 
30. For example, in Wills v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 69-610, 69-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9401 (1969), Maury Wills received the Hickok belt as a "trophy" for his 
athletic performance during 1962 and an MG automobile in recognition of his being the most 
popular Los Angeles Dodger that year. Without discussing whether the fair market value of these 
items was less than their retail value, the court held that Wills had to include in his income the fair 
market value of the items. I d. at 543,23 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 69-1520, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
at 84,644. 
Similarly, in Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (1967), the court required the taxpayer 
to include the fair market value of a Corvette received as a prize during the year. In both of these 
cases the taxpayers retained and used the prize received. Accordingly, it seems justified that the 
retail value of the prize should be included in taxpayer's income. 
31. 621 F.2d 731,46 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 80-5118, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9556 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
32. Id. at 736-37, 46 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 80-5390 to -5391, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 
84,813-14. 
The court agreed with the government that the fair market value of obtaining similar services 
on facilities in an arm's-length transaction in an open market was the proper standard for meas-
uring income inclusion. The government, however, in its argument attempted to measure the 
amount of inclusion by looking to the allocated cost of providing flights. Id. at 737, 46 
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 80-5390, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84,814. 
33. Id. at 739, 46 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 80-5393, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84,815. 
34. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TAX RETURNS FOR 
1969 THROUGH 1972 (1974). 
35. Id. at 161-62. 
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calculation of fair market value when it would have resulted in an inac-
curate measure of enrichment and, therefore, in unfairness to the recip-
ient of the property. In McCoy v. Commissioner,36 for example, a 
taxpayer received a new Lincoln automobile from his employer and 
exchanged the car with a dealer for a new Ford station wagon and 
$1,000 in cash. The court found that the taxpayer realized income in 
the amount for which he could have sold the car, rather than its retail 
price (replacement value).37 The court's approach, though clouded by 
a confusing opinion, apparently measured the amount of enrichment 
received by the taxpayer.38 The measure used by the court, the liquida-
tion value, accurately reflected the enrichment of a taxpayer who dis-
posed of the property soon after its original receipt. 
Similarly, in Turner v. Commissioner,39 the taxpayers received two 
first-class steamship tickets from New York to Buenos Aires as a prize 
in a contest. The taxpayers exchanged the tickets for four roundtrip 
tourist steamship tickets between New York and Rio de Janiero. The 
Tax Court held that the taxpayers did not have to include the $2,220 
value of the tickets they won. Instead, they could include a lesser 
amount ($1,400) that reflected the reduced value of the tickets to the 
taxpayers in their particular circumstances.40 Thus, by looking to the 
actual enrichment of the taxpayer, the court adopted a practical ap-
proach to determine the income to be included. 
The courts in McCoy and Turner believed that replacement value 
did not accurately measure the taxpayer's enrichment. In McCoy, the 
court measured the inequity objectively by looking to the disposition of 
the property. The liquidation price of the car accurately measured the 
amount of the taxpayer's enrichment. Accordingly, liquidation value 
was the proper measure of his income. The Turner court, on the other 
36. 38 T.C. 841 (1962). 
37. Id. at 843-44. 
38. I d. In McDonald v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 223 (1976), the Tax Court cited McCoy for 
the priD.ciple that an item may have different values to different persons, but refused to apply that 
principle in valuing lodging received by an employee. Instead, the court held that the price the 
taxpayer would have had to pay for the lodging was the appropriate measure of income inclusion. 
Id. at 234. The actual measure used by the court was the price paid by the employer. Id. 
39. 13 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 462 (1954). 
40. The court stated: 
The winning of the tickets did not provide them with something which they needed in 
the ordinary course of their lives and for which they would have made an expenditure in 
any event, but merely gave them an opportunity to enjoy a luxury otherwise beyond 
their means. Their value to the petitioners was not equal to the fair retail cost. 
/d. at 463. The court could not use the resale value as the measure of the amount includable in 
income, because the tickets were nontransferable. The court also noted that if the tickets were 
transferable and the taxpayer had attempted to sell those tickets, he would have received substan-
tially less than the cost of similar tickets purchased from the steamship company and would have 
incurred selling expenses. 
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hand, sought to correct a perceived inequity, although it did so without 
objective support for the determination of the taxpayer's enrichment. 
The taxpayers actually retained their prize, albeit in a slightly altered 
form. Turner and McCoy represent instances of a court's wrestling 
with the problems and injustices that result from strict application of a 
replacement value rule. 
2. Application of the Proposed Approach. -The variant valuation 
approach advocated in this Article leads to the conclusion that for in-
come inclusion purposes, fair market value generally should be meas-
ured by replacement value rather than liquidation value. The analysis 
views a transaction involving property as a two-payment transaction. 
A taxpayer who has received property as compensation should be re-
garded as having received cash, and then he should be viewed as hav-
ing engaged in a second transaction in which he "purchased" the 
property actually acquired for the cash he was deemed to have re-
ceived. This hypothetical cash transaction provides the correct meas-
ure of income, since an amount of cash equal to the replacement value 
of the property actually acquired would have been required to 
purchase the property. In other words, that amount of cash, equal to 
the replacement value of the acquired property, is the proper measure 
of enrichment for the receipt of property. Similarly, replacement value 
generally provides the proper measure of enrichment for the receipt of 
services. 
The repl~cement value rule in this situation prevents the economic 
distortion that would result from taxpayers bargaining for compensa-
tion in kind rather than in cash. Any rule including property or serv-
ices in income at less than replacement value would encourage 
taxpayers to bargain for payment in goods or services, thereby reducing 
their tax liability without reducing their accretion in wealth. ·Such bar-
gaining would skew production towards the goods and services most 
amenable to such use, thereby distorting both production and con-
sumption. A tax system should be neutral with regard to economic 
choices unless Congress uses the system to create specific incentives.41 
A replacement value rule will also prevent inequity among taxpay-
ers. A taxpayer whose employer has access to goods or services at dis-
count prices, for example, can obtain wealth or enjoy personal 
consumption with a lesser tax burden than another taxpayer working 
for an employer without such access. Other rules of valuation would 
41. See generally S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 126-74 (1973) (discussing tax in-
centives as a device for implementing government policy). 
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create horizontal inequity and unfairness by imposing an unequal tax 
on individuals with equal amounts of economic income. 
In a majority of the cases, the replacement value rule will not 
cause inequity, because the taxpayer has made a voluntary decision to 
receive the property or services. In some situations, however, the recip-
ient has not been given a voluntary choice between property and cash 
and must either accept the property or forego all or a substantial part of 
his income. Theoretically, the taxpayer in this situation has not been 
enriched by the full amount of the replacement value, because his 
wealth (as he would measure it in money) has not increased by that full 
amount. The facts in Turner demonstrate the inequity of the replace-
ment value rule in situations in which taxpayers have not made a vol-
untary choice to receive the property.42 Nevertheless, Turner's purely 
subjective approach is not an acceptable solution. 
The weakness of the subjective approach to determining fair mar-
ket value is that it permits taxpayers to assert false claims of devalued 
enrichment. The integrity of the self-assessment tax system would be 
weakened by taxpayers undervaluing in-kind income allegedly forced 
upon them.43 Subjective valuation would also create a disparity be-
tween the payor's deduction and the recipient's income. An employer, 
for example, could compensate an employee in kind and deduct the 
cost of the property or services. The employee, in tum, could claim a 
smaller value, based upon the worth of the property to him, as includ-
able in his income. A totally subjective approach to valuation, there-
fore, would create an environment conducive to abuse of the valuation 
rules.44 
There are, however, situations in which a departure from replace-
ment value can be made without significant risks of abuse. An ideal 
42. 13 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) at 462-63. 
43. In a related area, the Fifth Circuit in Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467, 46 A.F.T.R. 
2d (P-H) t 80-5288, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) t 9732 (5th Cir. 1980), rejected a claimed business 
deduction for expenses for clothes suitable for general wear but not in the particular taxpayer's 
lifestyle. The court adopted ~ objective test of deductibility independent of the particular tax-
payer's preferences or ~~:eeds .. 
44. Furthermore, the same risk is present if nonsubjective liquidation value is used to value 
the employee's receipt, because the payor will deduct his cost. See text accompanying notes 81-87. 
If the employer purchased the item at the replacement value, his business deduction will be 
his purchase price. If the purchase price was greater than the replacement value because the 
employer made an unwise purchase, his business deduction should be limited to replacement 
value with respect to the employee's compensation; but he should be allowed an ordinary loss 
deduction for the excess of what he paid over the true value. If he purchased the item for less than 
replacement value, his deduction should be the amount of the replacement value, but he should 
have ordinary income for the excess of that value over his purchase price. In all cases, payment of 
a deductible expense with property purchased for that purpose should have the net effect of the 
cost of the item being fully deductible. 
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situation for such a departure exists under the facts in McCoy.4 s 
Where the taxpayer has sold the property soon after receipt, so that 
from his point of view the disposition can be viewed as part of the same 
transaction, the sale proceeds represent an objective standard of enrich-
ment. In the case of a subsequent and immediate sale, the taxpayer 
shows objectively that the property received was worth less to him than 
its replacement value. In that event, the property should be valued at 
the price actually received at its disposition. 
This modification to the replacement value rule is consistent with 
the proposed analysis. A taxpayer who performed services and re-
ceived payment in property that he then sold without using for personal 
purposes should be treated as if he had received compensation in cash. 
The hypothetical cash deemed received by the taxpayer in the first 
transaction would place him in the same economic position that he ulti-
mately achieves upon completion of the second transaction. The pro-
ceeds from his sale of the property establish an objective valuation of 
his enrichment. Therefore, these proceeds should be the measure of 
income.46 
The adoption of a liquidation value standard in situations in 
which property received is subsequently disposed of should be ana-
lyzed for consistency with existing tax principles. Under this approach, 
the cash sale proceeds relate back to the original transaction to deter-
mine for purposes of income inclusion the fair market value of the 
property received. This result, however, can be reached if each transac-
tion is viewed independently under existing tax principles. In the first 
transaction, the property is valued at its replacement value, which is 
included in taxable income. The amount included in income becomes 
the basis of the property.47 If the property is sold subsequently for an 
amount below basis, the disposition results in a loss. This analysis, 
however, raises two issues regarding the nature of the loss: Is the loss 
on the sale deductible, and if so, is it a capital or an ordinary loss? 
Established tax principles should resolve both issues without creating 
an inconsistency with the liquidation value rule. 
In order for a loss resulting from a voluntary transaction to be 
deductible, it must be viewed as incurred either in the taxpayer's trade 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 37. 
46. This approach is less restrictive than that taken in the discussion draft of the proposed 
fringe benefit regulation, which would adopt a single replacement value standard of valuation for 
income inclusion purposes. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
47. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 46 A.F.T.R. 
(P-H) 1293, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9697 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
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or business or in a transaction entered into for profit.4s The require-
ments of deductibility should be satisfied as long as no personal use has 
been made of the property.49 In the situation of an immediate sale, it is 
likely that the property has not been used for personal purposes; there-
fore, the loss should be deductible. 
The determination of the character of a deductible loss-ordinary 
or capital-depends on the nature of the property involved in the trans-
action. For the loss to be characterized as ordinary rather than capital, 
the property must be viewed as connected with the taxpayer's trade or 
business.50 In this situation, two theories may justify ordinary loss 
characterization. First, property received as compensation may be 
viewed as bearing an integral relationship to the taxpayer's business of 
performing services; therefore, the taxpayer's motive in receiving and 
disposing of the property would be business rather than investment re-
lated. 51 Second, the sale of property, although an independent transac-
tion, may be viewed as relating back to the transaction in which the 
taxpayer received the property, and therefore the gain or loss from the 
second transaction should take its character from the original transac-
tion. 52 These theories suggest that the loss incurred as a result of the 
second transaction should be characterized as an ordinary deductible 
loss. Therefore, the net effect of the receipt transaction and subsequent 
sale under existing tax principles should be similar to the result reached 
under the liquidation standard.53 Accordingly, the variant valuation 
approach advocated by this Article characterizes fair market value for 
48. I.R.C. § 165(c)(l), (2) (1976). 
49. Compare, e.g., Marx v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 173, 174 (1945), acq. 1946-1 C.B. 3, and 
Campbell v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 272, 274 (1945) (allowed losses on inherited property sold soon 
after acquisition where there was no post-acquisition personal use of the property), with 
Horrmann v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 903, 910 (1951), acq. on other grounds 1952-1 C.B. 2 (disal-
lowed loss because of personal use). 
50. See Com Prod. Ref. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52, 47 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1789, 1793, 55-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9746, at 56,064 (1955). 
51. The property may be referred to as a Corn Products asset, the sale or exchange of which 
gives rise to an ordinary gain or loss. See Com Prod. Ref. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 
A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1789, 55-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1[9746 (1955). 
52. See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 42 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 649, 52-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 9527 (1952) (Court applied similar rationale to hold that a payment by the transferee of a 
liquidated corporation on a judgment rendered against that corporation was a capital loss even in 
the absence of a sale or exchange since the payment related back to the prior liquidation). 
53. There exists one possible difference between the result reached under the proposed ap-
proach and the hypothetical two-step transaction. Under the proposed approach, the sales pro-
ceeds are includible in income in the year the property is received. Under the alternative analysis, 
however, sales made in subsequent years will create a timing difference. The replacement value of 
the property is includible in income in the year the property is received, and the loss is deductible 
only in the year the property is sold. 
845 
HeinOnline -- 60 Tex. L. Rev. 846 1981-1982
Texas Law Review Vol. 60:833, 1982 
income inclusion purposes in a manner consistent with established tax 
principles. 
B. Fair Market Valuation in the Estate and Gift Tax Area 
1. The Existing State of the Law. -The estate and gift tax provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code are designed to tax the transfer of 
wealth.54 The estate tax provisions impose a tax on a decedent's estate 
upon transfer of the property at his or her death.55 The tax is imposed 
on the value of all property owned by the decedent at his death and 
certain other property otherwise includible in his estate by virtue of 
either a prior lifetime transfer or a power of appointment that he had 
over the disposition of the property. 56 
The Treasury takes the position that property in a decedent's es-
tate is includible at its replacement value, rather than its liquidation 
value. 57 Treasury regulations require that the executor value the prop-
erty at its price in the market in which the item is most commonly sold 
to the public.58 An automobile, for example, would be valued at its 
54. See generally C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GiFT 
TAXES 1-2 (3d ed. 1974). The gift tax serves as a backstop for the estate tax and is used similarly 
to tax wealth transfers. See Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 25 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1166, 41-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 1013 (1941); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL EsTATE 
AND GiFT TAXATION~ 1.03 (4th ed. 1982). 
55. I.R.C. § 2001 (1976) (providing that "[a] tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the 
taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States"). 
56. See id §§ 2031-41 (1976). See generally R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra 
note 54, at 511, ~ 1.02-1.04[7). 
57. For example, the value of a single premium life insurance policy at the date of death is, 
for estate tax purposes, the amount the insurance company would charge a person the same age as 
the insured for a single premium contract. See Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-S(a), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 
432, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417, T.D. 7319, 1974-2 C.B. 297. See also supra note 53 and accompa-
nying text. 
58. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-l(b) (1965) provides as follows: 
The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross estate under sections 
2031 through 2044 is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death . . . . The 
fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a will-
ing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and 
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fa1r market value of a particu-
lar item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate is not to be determined by a 
forced sale price. Nor is the fair market value of an item of property to be determined by 
the sale price of the item in a market other than that in which such item is most com-
monly sold to the public, taking into account the location of the item wherever appropri-
ate. Thus, in the case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, 
which is generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value of 
such an item of property is the price at which the item or a comparable item would be 
sold at retail. For example, the fair market value of an automobile (an article generally 
obtained by the public in the retail market) includible in the decedent's gross estate is the 
price for which an automobile of the same or approximately the same description, make, 
model, age, condition, etc., could be purchased by a member of the general public and 
not the price for which the particular automobile of the decedent would be purchased by 
a dealer in used automobiles. Examples of items of property which are generally sold to 
the public at retail may be found in§§ 20.2031-6 and 20.2031-8. The value is generally 
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retail value as a used automobile, rather than at the price for which a 
dealer would purchase the car from the estate.59 There are, however, 
two notable exceptions to the general replacement value rule in the es-
tate tax area: the valuation of tangible personal property sold under 
certain circumstances and the valuation of corporate stock. 
The Internal Revenue Service has adopted a more lenient ap-
proach than that suggested in the estate and gift tax regulations in cases 
in which the property is tangible personal property and is sold through 
advertisement or auction within a reasonable period after the valuation 
date. 60 In these situations the Service permits the estate to use the ac-
tual sales price rather than the replacement cost as the fair market 
value.61 A similar result is accomplished through the estate administra-
tion expense deduction when the estate sells property in order to realize 
cash necessary to pay debts, expenses, and taxes, to discharge legacies, 
or to preserve the estate. 62 Sales of property for other purposes do not 
to be determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value as of the applicable 
valuation date of each unit of property. For example, in the case of shares of stock or 
bonds, such unit of property is generally a share of stock or a bond. Livestock, farm 
machinery, harvested and growing crops must generally be itemized and the value of 
each item separately returned. Property shall not be returned at the value at which it is 
assessed for local tax purposes unless that value represents the fair market value as of the 
applicable valuation date. All relevant facts and elements of value as of the applicable 
valuation date . . . shall be considered in every case. The value of items of property 
which were held by the decedent for sale in the course of a business generally should be 
reflected in the value of the business. For valuation of interests in businesses, see 
§ 20.2031-3. See§ 20.2031-2 and§§ 20-2031-4 through 20.2031-8 for further informa-
tion concerning the valuation of other particular kinds of property. For certain circum-
stances under which the sale of an item of property at a price below its fair market value 
may result in a deduction for the estate, see paragraph (d)(2) of§ 20.2053-3. 
This regulation is the authority most often cited as support for the retail value rule. See, e.g., 
Alma Piston Co. v. Commissioner, 579 F.2d 1000, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 78-5095, 78-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ~ 9591 (6th Cir. 1978). 
59. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-l(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6684, 1963-2 C.B. 411, T.D. 
6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367. 
In Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 C.B. 110, the Internal Revenue Service carried this approach to an 
extreme in taking the position that the estate tax value of jewelry not only should reflect the price 
at which a dealer would sell the property, but also the excise tax that is charged to the buyer in this 
situation. 
60. See Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002 (presuming that the actual sales price is the retail 
sales price). 
61. Id 
62. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)-2, T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 
T.D. 7612, 1979-1 C.B. 307. 
See Estate of Blossom v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941), nonacq. 1966-2 C.B. 7. See 
also Estate of Papson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 290 (1979) (brokerage charge for fmding replace-
ment tenant allowed as estate tax deduction because sale of property might have been required to 
meet estate's obligation to pay estate tax installment payments under § 6166A of the Code). 
Several courts have differed on the definition of necessary expenses and on the issue of from 
whose perspective the necessity is determined. Compare Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 
673, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 147,824, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 12,913 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding 
that the estate fiduciary's good faith judgment that a sale is in the best interests of the estate, as 
approved by the state probate court, should be sufficient to establish "necessity"), with Estate of 
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receive this favorable treatment, however.63 The increment in the es-
tate's value resulting from property that passes to beneficiaries of the 
estate or is sold either for nonallowable purposes .or in a nonpermissi-
ble manner will be its replacement value. 
The departure from the strict replacement value rule in estate tax 
valuation is largely consistent with the McCoy case,64 the rule's ana-
logue in the income inclusion area, but it falls short of the variant valu-
ation approach proposed by this Article by failing to extend the 
departure to nonallowable sales. Application of the liquidation value 
rule in all cases involving sales would provide an objective determina-
tion of the amount of wealth transferred by the decedent. 
Publicly traded corporate stock represents the second exception to 
the replacement value standard. Such stock is generally valued at the 
average high and low selling prices on the date of valuation, without 
reduction for potential sales commissions in the event of its sale. 65 The 
value of the stock is not increased by the amount of the sales commis-
sion that would have to be paid if the estate had purchased the stock. 
The rule, therefore, technically fails to conform to either the replace-
ment or the liquidation value standard.66 
The replacement value versus liquidation value controversy in es-
tate tax litigation has centered around the proper treatment of selling 
expenses. This issue reached the Supreme Court in the context of valu-
ing open-ended mutual fund shares owned by the decedent at his 
Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 147,972, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
~ 13,046 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (affirming a Tax Court decision that a 
state probate court fmding that a sale is necessary is not determinative of "necessity" for federal 
income tax purposes). 
63. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2053-3(a), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, T.D. 
7612, 1979-1 C.B. 307 (providing that expenses not essential to the administration of the estate, but 
rather incurred for the individual benefit of the beneficiaries of the estate are not deductible). 
64. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
65. Treas. Reg.§ 20.231-2(b) (1981). See Scott v. Henricksen, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1465, 41-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,098 (W.D. Wash. 1941). Although real estate is typically sold with a 
brokerage charge, it is not considered property of the type whose valuation for estate tax purposes 
is reduced by the brokerage commission. See Estate ofGrootemaat v. Commissioner, 38 TAX CT. 
MEM. DEC. (CCH) 198 (1979) (refusing to allow valuation of property to be reduced by the real 
estate broker commission that would have been payable on the disposition of the properties). But 
see Watts, The Fair Markel Value of Actively Traded Securities, 30 TAX LAW. 51 (1976) (discussing 
a variety of different valuations based on special circumstances). 
Under ordinary circumstances, the existence of an organized, well-defmed market and the 
fungibility of the property in question permits the assertion that sales of other shares on the ex-
change are presumptive evidence of the price that could be obtained for a particular stock. See, 
e.g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 75-702, 75-l U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9480 (3d Cir. 1975); Estate of Damon v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 108 (1967); 
Estate of Wright v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 551 (1941). 
66. See Treas. Reg.§ 20.203l-2(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 7312, 1974-l C.B. 277, 
T.D. 7327, 1974-2 C.B. 294, T.D. 7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264. See infra text accompanying notes 117-
23. 
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death. In United States v. Cartwright, the Court faced the problem of 
valuing shares that had no public market.67 The Court could have val-
ued the shares at the price at which they were sold by the mutual fund 
to the general public--replacement value-or at the price at which a 
shareholder could redeem his shares in the fund-liquidation value. 
The mutual fund shares were not publicly traded; therefore, the 
general public could purchase shares directly from the fund only at the 
so-called "asked" price.68 The asked price represented the portion of 
the net asset value of the fund allocable to the share, plus a "load" 
charge. The load charge represented the sales commission paid to fund 
underwriters as compensation for selling the fund shares. Mutual fund 
share owners, however, could redeem their shares in the fund only at 
the so-called "bid" price.69 The fund stood ready to repurchase any 
shares from a shareholder at a price equal to the portion of the net asset 
value of the entire fund allocable to the redeemed shares. Thus, the bid 
price, in essence, was the liquidation value of the shares, and the asked 
price, which exceeded the bid price by exactly the amount of the load, 
was the replacement value of the shares. 
The Internal Revenue Service, relying on a regulation that it sub-
sequently withdrew, argued for replacement value.70 The Service con-
tended that willing buyers would pay the asked price and that the fund 
was a willing seller.71 If mutual fund shares were viewed in the same 
way as property such as life insurance,72 then its replacement value 
would necessarily include the various expenses associated with offering 
the property for sale at the retail value. 
The estate argued for the liquidation value, analogizing the fund 
shares to ordinary publicly traded corporate stock.73 Corporate stock is 
includible in a decedent's estate only in the amount that would be real-
ized if the shares were sold. 74 This amount is neither increased by the 
67. 411 U.S. 546, 31 A.F.T.R2d (P-H)' 147,832, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)' 12,926 (1973). 
68. Id. at 549, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 73-1462, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 81,310. 
69. Id. at 547, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 73-1461, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 81,310. 
70. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-8(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417, T.D. 
7319, 1974-2 C.B. 297. The Treasury Department promulgated this regulation in 1958 after years 
of confusion within the department and between the Treasury and Justice Departments. 
71. 411 U.S. at 551-52, 31 A.F.T.R2d (P-H) at 73-1463 to -1464, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
at 81,311-12. 
72. Life insurance owned by the decedent on the life of another is valued for estate inclusion 
purposes at its replacement value, not its cash surrender value. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a), 
T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417, T.D. 7319, 1974-2 C.B. 297. See also 
Tuttle v. United States, 436 F.2d 69, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)' 71-313, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 
9140 (2d Cir. 1970). 
73. 411 U.S. at 551, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 73-1464, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 81,312 
(The Court noted that this argument "has the clear ring of common sense to it."). 
74. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
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broker's commission paid upon acquisition of new shares, nor de-
creased by the sales commission normally paid upon disposition of the 
shares. The Supreme Court found the regulation invalid75 and held for 
the estate, including only the liquidation value of the shares in the es-
tate computation.76 
The Cartwright opinion failed to address the legal issue of whether 
replacement value or liquidation value was the proper measure for es-
tate tax inclusion. The Court focused on the brokerage charge for 
purchasing the shares and compared this charge io a broker's commis-
sion on the sale of ordinary corporate stock. Thus, the Court seemed to 
decide only that a separately stated sales commission or any similar 
charge, like a load charge, should be excluded for purposes of deter-
mining the value of the decedent's property included in the estate.77 
The Court should have recognized the larger issue and squarely de-
cided the proper method of valuation for estate tax inclusion purposes. 
At present, property valuation in the estate tax area is usually de-
termined by its replacement value for inclusion in the decedent's estate. 
There is an exception for corporate stock and, perhaps, other property 
that is purchased with a separately stated sales commission or similar 
charge. Such property is valued without taking the commission or 
charge into account. There is also an exception for an immediate arm's 
length sale of the property in a permissible manner by the estate, and, 
in effect, an exception created by means of a deduction for other sales 
by the estate for certain allowable purposes.78 
2. Application of the Proposed Approach. -Application of the va-
riant valuation approach indicates that, for estate and gift tax purposes, 
the measure of value of property passed to a beneficiary generally 
should be replacement value. Under the proposed analysis, the dece-
dent's property would be treated as if the estate had sold the property 
for cash and transferred the cash to the beneficiary, who in tum 
purchased the property. Because the cash hypothetically received by 
the estate provides the measure of the inclusion and because an amount 
75. 411 U.S. at 550,31 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 73-1465,73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 81,313-14. 
76. The Treasury subsequently amended this regulation to provide that the inclusion value 
for open-ended land mutual funds is the bid price. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-8(b)(l), T.D. 6296, 1958-
2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417, T.D. 7319, 1974-2 C.B. 297. ("The fair market value of a 
share in an open-ended investment company (commonly known as a "mutual fund") is the public 
redemption price of a share."). 
77. The Court decision is also subject to criticism in its analysis of buy-sell agreements where 
decedents are not required to sell at a particular price, but this shortcoming is not directly relevant 
to the issue at hand. 
78. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. 
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of cash equal to the replacement value of the property would have to be 
transferred to the beneficiary in order for him to have purchased the 
property, replacement value is the proper measure of estate inclusion. 
A similar analysis leads to the same result for gift tax purposes. 
The replacement value rule conforms to the policy objectives of 
estate and gift taxation. These provisions are designed to tax the trans-
fer of wealth,79 which is the additional amount of wealth accruing to 
the beneficiary from the inheritance or gift. The transfer should be 
measured by the expenditure that the recipient has avoided by receiv-
ing the property in kind. 
If the estate disposes of the property shortly after the transfer, 
however, the measure of wealth transferred should be the actual sales 
proceeds, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the disposition. 
The sales proceeds-liquidation value-provide an objective means for 
determining the value of the property. That value is the amount of 
cash that the transferor would have had to transfer in order to put the 
transferee in the same economic position as he occupies at the conclu-
sion of the entire transaction. 
There is one additional situation in which, ideally, liquidation 
value should be applied. It is conceivable that a beneficiary, given a 
choice, would not purchase the property received by bequest or gift. 
Arguably, in this situation, the equitable measure of value should be 
the liquidation value. The difficulty with this approach, however, is 
making the determination whether the beneficiary would have 
purchased the property. One suspects that the subjectivity of the in-
quiry would create fraudulent claims if there were a possibility that it 
would reduce the transfer tax. As in the area of income taxation, it is 
important that valuation determinations be made on objective bases. 
One possible solution to this problem would be to apply the liquidation 
value rule to estate or gift tax valuation if the beneficiary disposed of 
the property at or soon after its distribution. As a practical matter, 
most property would be converted into cash prior to the distribution 
anyway if it were not desired by the beneficiary. Regardless of whether 
the objective test were extended in this manner, such a test is desirable 
as a requirement for using liquidation value in order to prevent fraudu-
lent claims of undervalued property. 
The variant valuation approach proposed by this Article properly 
characterizes value for estate and gift tax purposes. In general, replace-
ment value should be used for valuing property included in an estate. 
79. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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If, however, the estate or possibly the recipient disposes of the property, 
the sales proceeds-liquidation value-should be used to value the 
property for estate or gift tax purposes. The use of a strict replacement 
standard would preclude the benefits of a flexible standard for valua-
tion in the estate tax area. 8o 
C Fair Market Valuation for Business .Deduction Purposes 
1. Existing State of the Law. -Generally, a business taxpayer 
who transfers property to pay for a deductible item, such as in compen-
sation for services, is allowed a deduction for the fair market value of 
the property.81 Although no court has articulated an approach to fair 
market value in this area, an analysis of analogous case law indicates 
that courts would use replacement value as the measure of the deduc-
tion. The replacement value approach follows from an extension of the 
definition of cost. 
Under the Philadelphia Park decision, cost in a noncash transac-
tion is, for purposes of determining basis, the fair market value of prop-
erty received. 82 The fair market value of property is determined by 
looking to its value as determined in the income inclusion context. As 
concluded in Part IliA of this Article, replacement value is the appro-
priate measure of value for income inclusion purposes; therefore, re-
placement value should determine cost as well. Similarly, deductions 
for depreciation of the property, which in the aggregate will equal the 
cost of the property,83 must also be based on the replacement value of 
the property at the time of its noncash acquisition. 84 
The notion of using the value of the property received as the 
amount of the deduction is referred to as the "value received theory of 
80. Although the possibility of an undesired receipt seems more likely with respect to lifetime 
gifts, the same rule of valuation should apply to gifts and bequests. A different conclusion would 
allow circumvention of the estate tax through the form of lifetime transfers. 
81. See United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 6 A.F.T.R2d (P-H)~ 60-5133,60-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9678 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Freighting Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 30 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1433,43-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9334 (2d Cir. 
1943); Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 68-538, 68-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9366 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See also A.P. Smith Mfg. v. United States, 364 F.2d 831, 18 
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 5130, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9552 (Ct. Cl. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
1003 (1967); Rev. Rul. 69-181, 1969-1 C.B. 196; Rev. Rul. 69-75, 1969-1 C.B. 52; Rev. Rul. 62-217, 
1962-2 C.B. 59. 
82. See supra note 16. 
83. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1976). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, H.R. 
4961, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 208(a)(l), 96 Stat. 432 (1982), created an exception to this rule for most 
property acquired after December 31, 1982, that is subject to the investment tax credit. Generally, 
in such a case the basis of the acquired property is reduced by 50% of the amount of the credit. 
84. If the cost of property is completely deductible in the year of acquisition, the amount of 
the deduction also should be the replacement value of the property at the time of acquisition. 
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deductions.''85 This approach has been applied in the context of inter-
est-free loans,86 and has been succinctly stated as follows: 
[W]henever a noncash economic benefit is received under cir-
cumstances making its value an item of gross income, the tax-
payer must be treated as if he paid for the benefit. Thus, when a 
taxpayer receives title to property as compensation or a dividend, 
he includes the property's fair market v<ilue in his income. He is 
treated as having paid that market value to acquire the property; 
the amount deemed paid becomes his cost basis in the property.87 
Accordingly, the amount deemed paid for determining a business ex-
pense deduction should be the same as if the property were received as 
income. 
2. Application of Proposed Approach. -The variant valuation ap-
proach advocated by this Article indicates that, for business expense 
deduction purposes, value generally should be measured by replace-
ment value. A taxpayer who exchanges property for a deductible ex-
pense should be deemed to have sold that property for cash and 
subsequently to have used the cash to pay for the deductible expense. 
The hypothetical cash represents the amount of the business expense 
deduction. This amount is measured by the replacement value of the 
item obtained in an arm's length transaction in exchange for the prop-
erty. The deduction, therefore, is the replacement value. 
Many barter exchanges take the form of an exchange of property 
for services. This type of exchange poses a special problem with the 
value of the consideration received. When the value of the considera-
tion received cannot be determined, it is presumed to be equivalent to 
the value of the property transferred. 88 Thus, the amount of the deduc-
tion ultimately depends upon the value of the property used to pay for 
the services. Again, the question arises whether replacement or liqui-
dation value is the appropriate measure. The circularity, however, is 
only apparent. The presumed equivalence theory is grounded on the 
assumption that in an arm's length transaction, the value of the consid-
eration received by both sides will be equal; that is, willing buyers and 
85. See Keller, The Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans: A Two Transaction Approach, 1 
VA. TAX REV. 241, 271-75 (1981). 
86. See, e.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1137, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 81-5127, 
at 81-5537 to -5538, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9534, at 87,762-63 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting). 
87. See Keller, supra note 85, at 273. 
88. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 9 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 62-661, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 9509 (1962). ])avis involved the transfer of appreciated property by a husband to his 
wife as part of a property settlement incident to a divorce. 
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~illing sellers will value them equally.89 In theory, the hypothetical 
marketplace must be the same for the service and the product. Since 
the services are valued at replacement value (the amount one would 
pay to purchase them in the market), it follows that the property also 
must be valued at replacement value in that same market. Any other 
rule would be inconsistent with the underlying presumption of 
equality.90 
The variant valuation approach proposed by this Article results in 
the uniform application of the replacement value rule to the valuation 
of exchanged property used for business deductions. Although the ex-
change of services for property poses theoretical problems, the pre-
sumption of equal value justifies the replacement value approach in 
that situation as well . 
.D. Fair Market Valuation in the Casualty Loss Area 
1. Existing State of the Law. -The Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides a deduction to a taxpayer who sustains an uncompensated theft 
or casualty loss of property in an amount equal to the lesser of the 
taxpayer's basis in or the fair market value of the property.91 The regu-
lations in this area provide a method of valuation designed to recognize 
the true loss in value to the taxpayer.92 Replacement cost, in the case of 
a total loss, is the amount it would cost the taxpayer to replace the 
property with property of like kind and equivalent condition. This 
amount does not represent the full cost of the new item; rather, the cost 
of new property must be reduced by a depreciation factor for the tax-
payer's previous use of the item.93 
89. Id 
90. The amount of the deduction should be equal to the value of the services purchased with 
the property. The value of those services is determined under the presumed equivalence theory by 
the value of the property exchanged for those services. This exchange results in taxable gain to the 
taxpayer on the exchange of his appreciated property based upon the replacement value of the 
services received. Since for income inclusion purposes those services are valued at replacement 
value to the taxpayer, it follows under the presumed equivalence theory that replacement value of 
the property should be used to measure the amount of the business deduction. 
91. I.R.C. § 165(a), (b) (1976). See Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468, 21 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 
1241, 39 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9229 (1939). Deductions for losses that are not incurred in a trade 
or business or in a transaction entered into for profit are allowed under§ 165(c)(3) if such losses 
arise from casuality or theft, but only if and to the extent that the loss exceeds $100 and such 
excess exceeds 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 165(h) (West Supp. 1982). 
Section 165(c) was amended in 1982 by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 
H.R. 4961, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 203{b), 96 Stat. 422 (1982). 
92. Treas. Reg.§ 1.165-7(a)(2), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 106, T.D. 6735, 1964-1 C.B. 100, T.D. 
6786, 1965-1 C.B. 107, T.D. 7522, 1978-1 C.B. 59. 
93. See id. at § 1.165-7(a)(2)(ii). 
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The regulations provide that the cost of repairs to the property will 
be regarded as "evidence of loss of value" if four conditions are met: 
(a) the repairs are necessary to restore the property to its condi-
tion immediately before the casualty, 
(b) the amount spent for such repairs is not excessive, 
(c) the repairs do not care for more than the damage suffered, 
and 
(d) the value of the property after the repairs does not as a result 
of the repairs exceed the value of the property immediately 
before the casualty.94 
The courts have held, on the other hand, that if repairs are not made, 
estimated repair costs will not be accepted as the proper measure of the 
deduction.95 Instead, the cases require a determination of fair market 
value without giving further guidance as to whether replacement value 
or liquidation value should be used.96 
The Internal Revenue Service has not taken a clear position on 
this issue. In an official publication distributed to the public to assist in 
the preparation of personal tax returns, the Service defmes fair market 
value as liquidation value-"the price at which you could have sold 
your property to a willing buyer . . . ."97 The publication provides an 
example of a chair destroyed by fire giving rise to a loss equal to the 
price the chair would have brought had the taxpayer tried to sell it 
immediately before the frre.98 In the same publication, however, the 
Service authorizes valuation of an automobile at its listed retail value, 
as set forth in the so-called blue books, adjusted for mileage and condi-
tion.99 The trade-in value of the automobile is not to be considered. 100 
2 Application of Proposed Approach-The variant valuation ap-
proach to property losses requires that the fair market value generally 
should be the liquidation value. Under the two-transaction approach, 
a taxpayer who sustains a casualty or theft loss of property should be 
regarded as having sold it for cash and subsequently having lost the 
94. Id (emphasis added). 
95. E.g., Brandom v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 78-5260 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 
1978) (estimated cost of work to repair damaged property was not sufficient to establish the de-
duction); Camphere v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 391, 396 (1978); Farber v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 
714, 719 (1972). q: Carloate Industries v. United States, 354 F.2d 814, 17 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 66-
017,66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9159 (5th Cir. 1966) (estimated cost of repairs to freeze-damaged 
land may be determinative of reduction in value). 
96. See cases cited supra note 95. 
97. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 547, TAX INFOR-
MATION ON DISASTERS, CASUALTIES, AND THEFTS 2 (1980). 
98. Id 
99. Id 
100. Id 
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cash received. The hypothetical cash provides the measure of the loss, 
and that amount is the liquidation value of the property. 
The liquidation value standard generally accords with the purpose 
of the casualty loss provision, which is to allow a deduction to alleviate 
hardship. Since, as in a sale of the property, the taxpayer no longer has 
the property after the loss, just as if he had sold it, the unrealized sale 
pr9ceeds should measure his reduction in wealth. 
There are situations, however, in which the transaction should not 
be regarded as ending with the loss of the cash. When the taxpayer 
actually replaces or repairs the lost or destroyed property, the amount 
of the loss is measurable by the cash expended for the replacement 
property or for repairs. Thus, as long as the replacement property or 
repaired property can be regarded as similar to the lost or destroyed 
property, the actual replacement value or repair cost is the appropriate 
measure of the loss. This approach is a logical extension of that 
adopted by the regulations with regard to the deductibility of repair 
cost. 101 It also provides an objective determinant of fair market value. 
Replacement value, of course, is the amount it would have cost the 
taxpayer to purchase similar property prior to the casualty, rather than 
the cost of new property, which would not reflect the depreciation of 
the old property. 
The difficulty with this approach is determining when the replace-
ment property is sufficiently similar to the destroyed property. Old, 
outdated clothing destroyed in a fire, perhaps, cannot be equated with 
its new replacement counterpart, even when adjusted for wear. A pos-
sible resolution to the problem of determining "similar property" may 
be found in the provisions permitting deferral of gain on involuntary 
conversions of property under Code section 1033.102 This provisional-
lows the deferral of gain realized on the involuntary conversion of 
property if the taxpayer purchases replacement property "similar or re-
lated in service or use to the property so converted." 103 This standard 
has been interpreted in the case law and could be used to help deter-
mine when a taxpayer should be viewed as having replaced lost 
101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
102. I.R.C. § 1033 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
103. I.R.C. § 1033 provides: 
Nonrecognition of gain.-If the taxpayer during [specified replacement] period ... for 
the purpose of replacing the property so converted, purchases other property similar or 
related in service or use to the property so converted . . . at the election of the taxpayer 
the gain shall be recognized only to the extent that the amount realized upon such con-
version (regardless of whether such amount is received in one or more taxable years) 
exceeds the cost of such other property . . . . 
I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
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property. 104 
Although the difference between replacement value and liquida-
tion value is often small, and the deductible loss is limited in any event 
to the taxpayer's basis in the property, 105 and no deduction is allowed 
until the amount of the loss over $100 exceeds the floor of 10% of ad-
justed gross income, 106 the confusion in this area should be resolved 
nevertheless. The policy considerations underlying casualty deductions 
require that taxpayers receive equitable and consistent treatment. Fur-
thermore, valuation in the tax law should be made with a rational and 
consistent approach. The variant valuation approach proposed in this 
Article not only clarifies fair market valuation for casualty loss deduc-
tion purposes but also has bearing on other areas as well. 
E. Fair Market Valuation for Charitable Contributions of Property 
1. Existing State of the Law. -The Internal Revenue Code allows 
a taxpayer a deduction for contributions to qualified charities.107 Tax-
payers can contribute cash or property to qualify for the deduction. 108 
If the taxpayer contributes property to the charity, a deduction is al-
lowed for the fair market value of the donated property at the time of 
the contribution, subject to several important limitations. The amount 
of the deduction may vary with the status of the property in the hands 
of the donor and, in some cases, with the character of the donee and the 
particular use of the property. 109 
104. See generally B. BITIKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS~ 44.3.3 
( 1981) (gain on involuntary conversions of property). 
105. E.g., I.R.C. § 165(b) (1976). 
106. I.R.C. § 165(h) (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 91. 
107. I.R.C. § 170 (1976). 
108. Id 
109. Treas. Reg.§§ 1.170A-l(c)(l), (2), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, T.D. 7340, 1975-1 C.B. 81; 
1.170A-4 (1972). 
With a minor exception created under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, H.R. 4242, 
Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 12l(a), 222(a), 263(a), 95 Stat. 196, 248, 264, the charitable contribution 
deduction is an itemized deduction and is subject to zero bracket amount limitations. In addition, 
there are dollar limitations to charitable contribution deductions based upon percentages of a 
taxpayer's adjusted gross income, the nature of the property, and the use to which the donee 
organization will put the property. 
Moreover, the amount deductible of a charitable contribution of property depends upon 
whether the sale of the property would give rise to ordinary income, short term capital gain, or 
long term capital gain. If the sale of the property would give rise to ordinary income or short term 
capital gain, the property is called "ordinary income property." The deduction allowed for the 
contribution of ordinary income property is its fair market value reduced by any amount that 
would be treated as ordinary income or short term capital gain if the property were sold. 
On the other hand, if the sale of the property would give rise to long term capital gain the 
property is called "capital gain property." The deduction allowed for the contribution of capital 
gain property depends upon the nature of the property and the use to which it will be put by the 
donee organization. If the property is intangible personal property or real property, a deduction is 
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The regulations in this area appear to adopt the rule that the value 
of the property contributed is measurea by its liquidation value. In the 
case of a contribution of property sold in the course of the taxpayer's 
business, fair market value is the price the taxpayer would have re-
ceived had he sold a similar quantity of goods in his customary 
market. 110 
Despite the Treasury regulations, the case law has been quite 
favorable to donors in permitting a deduction for contributed property 
equal to its replacement value. Donors generally have been allowed a 
charitable contribution deduction equal to the amount that they would 
have paid for the donated property, rather than the amount that they 
could have realized on its sale. 
In Goldman v. Commissioner, 111 for example, the court held that 
the allowable charitable deduction for a donation of medical journals 
was the "fair market value computed on the price an ultimate con-
sumer would pay, and that what might be paid by a dealer buying to 
resell is not proper consideration."112 Similarly, in Alma Piston Com-
pany v. Commissioner, 113 the court allowed the taxpayer to deduct the 
amount for which the donated machinery could have been sold by a 
dealer, even though the recipient, the Salvation Army, sold the machin-
ery for a much lower amount. The Alma Piston court cited the 
Goldman case as authority for applying the replacement value rule114 
and referred to the estate tax regulations, 115 which apply the replace-
ment value rule. It was clear that the court assumed that a single valu-
ation rule was appropriate in all contexts of the tax law. 116 
allowable, subject to statutory maximum limitations, in the amount of the fair market value of the 
property. If the property is tangible personal property, however, the deduction allowed is equal to 
the fair market value of the property only if the donee organization uses the property in its exempt 
function. For example, a donation of a work of art to an art museum would be allowable in an 
amount equal to its fair market value. If the tangible personal property is put to an unrelated use 
by the donee organization, then the charitable contribution deduction is equal to the fair market 
value of the property reduced by 40% (26 to 46% in the case of a corporation) of the amount of the 
gain which would have been long term capital gain if the property had been sold. 
llO. Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(c)(2), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, T.D. 7340, 1975-1 C.B. 81. 
111. 388 F.2d 476, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 68-301, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9126 (6th Cir. 
1967). 
ll2. Id. at 478, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 302, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,085. 
ll3. 35 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 464 (1976), qffd, 579 F.2d 1000, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 
78-5320, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9591 (6th Cir. 1978). 
114. Id. at 490. 
115. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-2(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, T.D. 
7327, 1974-2 C.B. 294, T.D. 7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264. See supra note 57. 
116. One commentator has suggested that the Goldman case may be applicable in other areas 
of the tax law. 15 FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2d (RESEARCH INST. OF AM.)~ K-3325 (5th Observa-
tion) (1983). There has been, however, very little analysis concerning the interrelationship of vari-
ous sections of the Internal Revenue Code with the concept of fair market value. 
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In .DanielS. McGuire, 117 the Tax Court applied the same replace-
ment value test to the donation of household furnishings and other con-
sumer goods in excellent condition to a hospital. 118 The hospital 
subsequently sold these items at an auction for prices substantially be-
low the values used for the charitable deduction. 119 The Service con-
tended that the fair market value of the property was the price received 
by the hospital at the auction. 120 The taxpayer, on the other hand, 
contended that the appropriate value was the cost that the taxpayer 
would have incurred if he had replaced the donated property with new 
items. 121 The Tax Court viewed fair market value as "the price this 
property would sell for if sold in the market and under circumstances 
in which the property of this type and quality would normally be 
sold," 122 not simply the price that could be obtained at public auction. 
Under this test, the fair market value of property would be the amount 
for which a dealer would normally sell the property. 123 This value is 
essentially the replacement value for t_he ultimate consumer. 
In Tuttle v. United States, 124 the Second Circuit limited the deduc-
tion for a contribution of a life insurance policy to liquidation value 
rather than replacement value. 125 The taxpayer in Tuttle had contrib-
I 17. 44 T.C. 801 (1965). 
II8. Id at 8II n.7. 
I 19. Id at 804. 
120. Id at 806. 
121. Id The taxpayer's deductions were based on appraisals of replacement value. 
122. Id at 809. In this connection, the court referred to Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-I(b), T.D. 6296, 
1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 6684, 1963-2 C.B. 41 I, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C. B. 367, which would have 
applied this same test to value property included in the decedent's estate; and Rev. Proc. 65-19, 
1965-2 C.B. 1002 (1965), which applied that regulation to property sold at public auction. 
123. 44 T.C. at 810. The court distinguished two of its prior decisions. In Philip Kaplan v. 
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 663 (1965), the Tax Court had decided a similar case of a charitable dona-
tion to the same hospital involved in the McGuire case, the donation having been followed by a 
sale of the donated property at a public auction. The court had held that the appraisal was a sham 
and of no evidentiary value and that the price brought at the auction sale was the best evidence of 
the fair market value of the donated property and therefore the measure of that fair market value. 
A similar result was reached in Maurice L. Rivkin v. Commissioner, 24 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. 
(CCH) 525 (1965). The court in McGuire distinguished those cases by viewing the auction sales 
price as the "most persuasive evidence of the fair market value of the type of property involved in 
those cases." 44 T.C. at 812. Neither of those cases, in the court's view, was intended to establish 
a public auction price as necessarily determinative of fair market value. In essence, McGuire is 
distinguished from the other two cases by the presence of a taxpayer who brought forth additional 
evidence of fair market value of the donated property, so that the court was not forced to decide 
between a single appraisal of replacement cost and the price actually brought at auction. The 
court had a reasonable alternative measure of fair market value. 
The dissenting opinions in McGuire, not without justification, viewed the majority's discus-
sion as inconsistent with the two prior cases. Placing almost conclusive reliance on actual sales of 
the donated property indicates the prior courts' view that the willing buyer-willing seller fair 
market value test should look to a market other than retail. The McGuire court, however, sought 
additional evidence in order to determine the retail value of the donated used property. 
124. 436 F.2d 69, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 71-313, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas.~ 9140 (CCH) (2d Cir. 
1970). 
125. See supra note 24. 
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uted a 'life insurance policy to various charitable organizations in suc-
cession. After each contribution, the taxpayer deducted an amount 
equal to the replacement value of the policy. He then repurchased the 
policy from the organization at its cash surrender value. 126 The court 
found the proper measure of the deduction to be the cash surrender 
value rather than the replacement value of the policy, even though it 
recognized that the appropriate measure of value for gift tax purposes 
is the replacement value of the policies.I27 
At one time, the Treasury recognized the replacement value test 
for charitable contributions. Revenue Ruling 55-138 128 adopted the 
position that the fair market value of contributed property was the re-
placement cost to the donor in his most favorable market. Revenue 
Ruling 68-69, 129 however, modified the prior ruling by substituting liq-
uidation value for replacement value as the measure of the deduction. 
The current Service position is unclear. In an official publication dis-
tributed to assist the public in the preparation of personal tax returns, 
the Service suggests replacement value as the appropriate standard for 
valuing charitable contributions of property. 130 
The liquidation value rule, however, has support in the legislative 
history of the charitable contribution provisions. The Revenue Act of 
1917J31 created the charitable contribution deduction; however, it was 
126. The taxpayer owned a paid-up policy, subject to an outstanding loan in an amount 
slightly less than the cash value without reduction for the loan on the policy. The replacement 
value of the policy represents the amount that the insurance company would charge to issue an 
identical policy to a person of similar age and health. The cash surrender value of the policy 
represents the amount the insured would receive if he surrendered the policy. In this case the 
replacement value exceeded the cash surrender value by more than $3,000. 
127. 436 F.2d at 71,27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 71-356,71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 85,651. See 
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 686, T.D. 6542, 1961-1 C.B. 420, T.D. 6680, 
1963-2 C.B. 417 (example 3 prescribes replacement value as the appropriate measure for valuing 
life insurance policies for gift tax purposes). See also Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 25 
A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1166, 41-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,013 (1941); Powers v. Commissioner, 312 
U.S. 259, 25 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1168, 41-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,015 (1941); United States v. 
Ryserson, 312 U.S. 260, 25 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1164,41-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,014 (1941); Treas. 
Reg.§ 20.2031-8, T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 11, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 C.B. 417, T.D. 7319, 1974-2 C.B. 
297 (example 2 provides a similar rule with regard to transfers under the estate tax). 
128. 1955-1 C.B. 223. 
129. 1968-1 C.B. 80 (permitting business taxpayer to deduct the lowest usual price of contrib-
uted inventory). 
130. Internal Revenue Service Publication 561, Determining the Value of Donated Property 7 
(Revised Nov. 1980), reprinted in 2 IRS PUBLICATIONS (CCH) ~ 33,901 (1981). In valuing used 
clothing, for example, the Service recommends using "the price buyers of such used items actually 
pay in used clothing stores, such as consignment or thrift shops." /d. A similar suggestion is made 
for automobiles with a reference made to the average dealer sales prices as a starting point for 
valuation. /d. at 8. 
131. Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1918). Section 1201(2) of that Act provided as follows: 
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or associations orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or education purposes, 
or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
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not until 1938 that Congress dealt specifically with deductions for con-
tributions of appreciated property. The Revenue Act of 1938132 origi-
nally contained a provision limiting the charitable contribution 
deduction for the donation of appreciated property to the lesser of ei-
ther the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the taxpayer or 
its fair market value. The House Ways and Means Committee report 
indicated that the bill was designed to eliminate the advantage to a 
donor who makes contributions in securities or other appreciated prop-
erty to avoid the tax on the unrealized gain. 133 The Senate, however, 
afraid that such a limitation would hurt educational and charitable in-
stitutions by discouraging charitable gifts in kind, eliminated the provi-
sion from the House bill. 134 In conference, the committee accepted the 
Senate changes.135 
The legislative history of the charitable contribution deduction, 
therefore, indicates that from its inception the amount of the deduction 
for contributions in kind would be the fair market value of the prop-
erty. The Senate and ultimately the entire Congress rejected the at-
tempt to exclude unrealized appreciation from the deduction; the 
appreciated value was explicitly approved. It is apparent, though, that 
the approved deduction was for no more than the amount for which the 
taxpayer could have sold the property. Therefore, the deduction fo-
cused on the liquidation value of the property donated to charity rather 
than on its replacement value. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 sought to deal with the inequity of 
taxpayers deriving greater benefit from donating appreciated property 
than if they had sold it and kept the cash proceeds. The committee 
report stated that "in some cases it was possible for a taxpayer to realize 
a greater after-tax profit by making a gift of appreciated property than 
by selling t~e property, paying tax on the gain, and keeping the 
income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual, to an 
amount not in excess of 15 per centum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed 
without the benefit of this paragraph. 
The report of the Conference Committee does nothing more than indicate that the Act was 
intended to create. a deduction for individuals contributing to charities up to the limit of 15 per 
cent of the taxpayer's taxable income. See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at 999 (1938). 
The Revenue Acts of 1918, 1921, 1924, and 1932 tampered with the details of the deduction 
but left the basic concept unchanged. See id. at 312, 733, 838, 917. 
132. Revenue Act of 1938, § 23{o), 52 Stat. 447 (current version at I.R.C. § 23{o) (1954)). 
133. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19-20 (1938). The Committee failed to see any 
justification in principle for the allowance of the deduction in the amount of unrealized apprecia-
tion that had never been included in taxable income. 
134. S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 14 (1938). 
135. H. REP. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1938). 
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proceeds." 136 
The amendments to the charitable contribution provision reduced 
the deduction for donations of ordinary income property and certain 
types of capital gain property. 137 Congress intended to eliminate the 
possibility of realizing a greater profit from a charitable gift of appreci-
ated property than from its sale. Nevertheless, this possibility still ex-
ists, even in cases of gifts of unappreciated property, if a donor may 
deduct an amount equal to the replacement value of the property when 
he would realize only its liquidation value in an arm's length sale. 
Therefore, the Joint Committee Staff apparently assumed that the 
value of the deduction would always equal the amount the taxpayer 
could realize on the sale of the property. While this analysis of the 
legislative history of the charitable contribution deduction is by no 
means conclusive, especially considering that the recent amendments 
came two years after the Goldman decision, it is instructive in deter-
mining how the provision fits into the statutory scheme for computing 
income. Perhaps the most important point of the legislative history is 
its indication that Congress thought the deduction should reflect the 
value of what the donor gives up. 
2 Application of the Proposed Approach. -The variant valuation 
approach requires that for the purpose of determining the charitable 
contribution deduction, fair market value should be measured by liqui-
dation value. Thus, when a taxpayer donates property to charity, he 
should be permitted to deduct only the amount that he could have re-
ceived upon the sale of such property, subject, of course, to statutory 
limitations. 138 The approach views a donor of property as having first 
sold the property for cash and then having contributed the cash to char-
ity. The amount that the donor could have realized from the sale of the 
property, its hypothetical cash value, should represent the measure of 
the deduction. 
Under the proposed approach, liquidation value is the correct 
standard to measure a charitable contribution deduction. The amount 
of the deduction, therefore, equals the decrease in the donor's wealth. 
136. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. REP. No. 13,270, ~ 413, 9lst 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 1645, 1663. 
137. See supra notes 109, 131-36. See also i'!fra note 169 and accompanying text. The chari-
table deductions provisions had been previously amended by the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. 
No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962), to reduce the amount of the deduction by the amount that would 
have been recaptured under I.R.C. § 1245 (1976). A similar limitation was enacted in 1964 to deal 
with recapture under I.R.C. § 1250 (1976). See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 
19 (1964). 
138. See supra note 109. 
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A taxpayer making a charitable contribution has the choice of giving 
either cash or property. If he transfers property, his decrease in wealth 
should be measured by the difference between his wealth had he sold 
the property and kept the proceeds, and his wealth after making the 
contribution. This approach limits the taxpayer's deduction to the 
amount for which he could have sold the donated property. 
Courts should apply the liquidation value approach to charitable 
contributions regardless of the long-established rule that a taxpayer is 
entitled to a deduction for the unrealized appreciation of donated prop-
erty.139 The two-transaction approach can be applied to determine 
value without creating taxable gain on the appreciated value. In fact, 
the court in Tasty Baking Co. v. United States pointed out that the two-
transaction approach was inappropriate for determining gain on the 
contribution of appreciated property because the contribution did not 
involve an exchange. The approach, however, can be used to deter-
mine the charitable contribution deduction, since it does not depend on 
the existence of an exchange. Thus, although the two-transaction ap-
proach is consistent with a flexible theory for determining fair market 
value, it does not have to be applied to determine gain on the 
transaction. 
F. Application of the Proposed Approach in Order to Prevent Abuse 
of the Charitable Contribution .Deduction 
The Service recently expressed concern that donors are taking 
larger charitable contribution deductions than allowed by law. 141 This 
discrepancy occurs when the deduction is measured by replacement 
value rather than by liquidation value. Several abusive schemes can 
create large charitable contribution deductions. If the deduction were 
measured by the liquidation value of the donated property, none of 
these schemes would distort charitable contribution deductions. The 
Service, however, has devised several novel responses to the schemes 
instead of attacking the source of the problem, which is the use of the 
replacement value standard. 
For example, bulk purchases sometimes afford the taxpayer the 
opportunity to buy property below retail cost. Under one abusive 
scheme, the taxpayer subsequently transfers the property on a piece-
meal basis to several charities and claims a charitable deduction for the 
replacement value of each item of property. In Revenue Ruling 79-
139. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
140. 393 F.2d 992, 995, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 68-538, at 1286, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
~ 9366, at 86,976-77 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
141. See infra notes 142-64. 
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419, 142 the Service analyzed a similar situation in which the taxpayer 
claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the list price of books 
even though he had purchased them in bulk at a lower price. 143 The 
Service denied a deduction for any amount in excess of the purchase 
price because it viewed the books as ordinary income property. 144 Or-
dinary income property is property that would not receive favorable 
capital gain treatment if it were sold at the time of its contribution. 145 
Under the charitable contribution provision, the deduction allowed for 
ordinary income property is its fair market value reduced by the 
amount of gain that would not have been long-term gain if the property 
had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value. 146 
In Revenue Ruling 79-419, 147 the Service took the position that the 
determination of whether property contributed to charity constituted 
ordinary income property should be made as if each contribution were 
a sale. Under that reasoning, the taxpayer who had never sold a book 
(and, therefore, for purposes of all other provisions of the Code would 
not have been a dealer in books148) should have been viewed as a 
dealer for purposes of the charitable contribution provision, at least if 
the number of individual gifts would have made him a dealer if the 
gifts had been sales. 149 Essentially, the Service would deny a charitable 
contribution deduction for the unrealized appreciation in property 
donated to a charity if the property were "held primarily for gifts to 
charities." 150 
142. 1979-2 C.B. 107. 
143. Id 
144. Id 
145. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(l), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, T.D. 7728, 1980-2 C.B. 
236. See also supra note 109. 
146. See supra note 109; I.R.C. § 170(e)(l) (West 1982). See also Treas. Reg.§ 1.70A-4(a)(l), 
T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, T.D. 7728, 1980-2 C.B. 236. 
Ordinary income property includes property held by a dealer primarily to sell to customers in 
the ordinary course of the donor's trade or business. 
147. 1979-2 C.B. 107. 
148. Presumably, if one of the items had been sold and the remaining items given to charity, 
any gain on the items sold would nevertheless constitute long term capital gain since the Service's 
position that the donor is a dealer appears to apply only for purposes of§ 170. 
The hypothetical dealer position of the Service, supra note 130, as applied to the book pur-
chaser situation in Rev. Rul. 79-419 represented a reversal of a position taken by the Service in a 
previous technical advice memorandum, Letter Ruling 7901001 (Sept. 15, 1977). In that Techni-
cal Advice Memorandum, the Service approved a deduction in the amount of the full fair market 
value of donated books (library books in that case) even though the books were purchased with 
the intention of making such a contribution. While the Service did not put forward the theoretical 
dealer argument, it did reserve the determination of the value of the books. 
149. 1979-2 C.B. 107. 
150. I d. The hypothetical dealer argument of the Service in Rev. Rul. 79-419 was foreshad-
owed by a Technical Advice Memorandum, Letter Ruling 7849008 (Aug. 30, 1978), in which the 
Service took the position that a horticulturist who grew plants and donated those plants to char-
ity-but never sold them-was denied a deduction for the contribution of the plants in excess of 
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If the Service had applied the approach proposed in this Article, 
the donor's deduction would have been limited to the liquidation value 
of the donated property. The taxpayer's scheme would have failed un-
less he had shown that he could have sold the books for more than he 
had paid for them. This showing would have been difficult to make 
unless the donor was in fact a dealer in books; and if the taxpayer was a 
dealer in books, his deduction would have been subject to the ordinary 
income limitations under the charitable contribution provision. 
A second scheme used to distort the charitable contribution deduc-
tion involves the purchase of property in bulk, the retention of the 
property for one year, and its subsequent contribution in bulk to a sin-
gle charity. Under this plan, the donor seeks a charitable contribution 
deduction equal to the replacement value of each individual piece of 
property, as opposed to the lower bulk price. Revenue Ruling 80-
233151 involved a taxpayer who purchased Bibles for eventual donation 
to a charity. 152 The Service disallowed the charitable contribution for 
any amount in excess of the purchase price of each particular Bible. 153 
In choosing a test to determine fair market value, the Service ruled that 
reference must be made to the "most active and comparable market 
place at the time of the donor's contribution."154 
The Service viewed the collection of Bibles donated to the charity 
as essentially a single block of property. 155 Presumably, the taxpayer 
could have donated the Bibles to the charity one at a time, or to several 
charities in different quantities, and each donation would have been 
valued at fair market value, which in tum was probably the replace-
their cost. The Service reasoned that if all of those donations had been sales, the horticulturist 
would have been held to be a dealer in plants and would not have been entitled to a deduction for 
the appreciation in value of those plants on a charitable gift. 
The Treasury followed this Technical Advice Memorandum by issuing Rev. Rul. 79-256, 
1979-2 C. B. 105, which applied the hypothetical dealer argument to two situations, one involving 
a horticulturist who donated plants to charity and the other involving a casual purchaser of litho-
graphs who donated the prints to various museums. 
The hypothetical dealer approach has been criticized by Anthione. See Anthoine, .Deductions 
for Charitable Contributions of Appreciated Property-The Art World, 35 TAX L. REV. 239, 262-63 
(1980). 
151. 1980-2 C.B. 69. 
152. /d The donor purchased 500 copies of a single edition of a modern translation of the 
Bible for a total price of $100x, for which the seller of the Bibles furnished him a statement that 
the property had a total retail value of $300x. The taxpayer donated the Bibles to a single charity 
that the seller had suggested. The taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction of $300x. 
153. Id The IRS noted that similar lots of Bibles had been sold to the general public for 
$100x at around the time of the contribution. The Service used those sales as "the most probative 
evidence of 'fair market' value." 
154. ld The market place was the one where similar quantities were being sold. Accordingly, 
the IRS held that the fair market value of the Bibles was $100x. 
155. Id 
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ment value. 156 At some point, the taxpayer's actions would fall into the 
category ofhypothetical sales under Revenue Ruling 79-419,157 thereby 
raising his status to that of a dealer for purposes of the charitable con-
trib!ltion provisions. It appears, however, that a point exists where the 
number of gifts is so small as to render the Service's dealer argument 
inapplicable, yet the number of block donations may be small enough 
so that the value of each would approach the retail value of the Bibles 
if they were sold individually. 
The proposed approach to fair market valuation would prevent 
this abusive scheme by limiting the deductions to liquidation value. 
The approach would solve the problem even in situations in which the 
dealer argument advanced in Revenue Ruling 79-419 would collapse. 
A donor who is not a dealer in Bibles would almost certainly not be 
able to demonstrate that he could have sold the Bibles for more than he 
paid for them. 158 
Finally, a third abusive scheme used by taxpayers to distort the 
charitable contribution deduction involves the bargain purchase of 
property that is subsequently donated to charity a year or more after 
purchase. Revenue Ruling 80-69159 involved a taxpayer who 
purchased an assortment of gems from a promoter at the so-called 
''wholesale" price. The promoter claimed the gems were actually 
worth three times the price paid for them. The taxpayer subsequently 
donated the gems to museums after he had held them for more than a 
year. The Service ruled that "[t]o determine fair market value, refer-
ence [must be] made to the most active marketplace at the time of the 
donor's contribution.'' 160 The estimate, however, must not be based on 
some artificially calculated estimate of value, but rather with a view 
towards the actual marketplace in which the gems change hands. 161 
That marketplace was the marketplace where the particular taxpayer 
purchased the gems from the promoter, and where similarly situated 
taxpayers purchased similar gems. Therefore, the market value of the 
gems was their purchase price.162 If the taxpayer, however, had shown 
156. The taxpayer could have broken up the lot of 500 Bibles and donated 100 Bibles to five 
charities. In that event, the blockage factor on the Bibles would not have had as great an effect, 
and perhaps the value of five blocks of 100 Bibles would have been greater than one block of500 
Bibles. See in.fra text accompanying notes 172-76. 
157. See supra notes 130, 148-150. 
158. Such a donor who is not a dealer would have no distribution chain noz: facilities to mar-
ket the Bibles efficiently and inexpensively. 
159. 1980-1 C.B. 55. 
160. Id The IRS took the position that the purported wholesale purchase was not in fact a 
wholesale purchase since it was generally available to members of the general public. 
161. Id 
162. Id 
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evidence of retail sales of similar gems at a higher price, the replace-
ment value rule would have supported a deduction based on the higher 
value.l63 If the Service had adopted liquidation value instead of re-
placement value as the measure of the deduction, this scheme would 
have failed even if comparable retail sales could have been shown. As 
long as the donor was not a dealer, he probably would have been un-
able to substantiate a liquidation value higher than his purchase price. 
The proposed analysis would defeat all three plans for distorting 
charitable contribution deductions. All of these schemes depend on the 
donor's ability to purchase property at prices below the normal retail 
price. Under all of the schemes, however, once the property is 
purchased by the donor, it cannot be sold by him for more than his 
purchase price. In fact, the donor purchases the property for the ex-
press purpose of making a profitable donation to a charity. Solutions 
to these problems should not rest on the questionable positions ad-
vanced by the government, but rather on the recognition that replace-
ment value does not represent the proper measure of value for a 
charitable contribution of property. The amount of the deduction for a 
charitable contribution should be the liquidation value of the donated 
property-the amount for which the donor could have sold it. 
Although the liquidation value standard would stop charitable 
contribution abuses, it would not affect all "favorable purchase" situa-
tions.164 Taxpayers who make true bargain purchases of property 
could still obtain the deduction on "unrealized" appreciation. That 
benefit is inherent in the charitable contribution provision and should 
not be affected by the definition of "fair market value." 
163. Id 
164. In Grossman v. Commissioner, for example, a taxpayer contributed property to charity 
that he had purchased a short time before at a price lower than the amount for which he could 
have resold it. 32 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 1013 (1973). The charity, in fact, sold the property 
for substantially more than the taxpayer had paid. The court allowed the deduction in the amount 
claimed by the taxpayer. 
The result in Grossman would be unchanged by the proposal advanced in this Article. In 
Grossman, the donor took advantage of avoiding tax on the value of the property that he could 
realize on the sale, in excess of its cost, a benefit specifically provided by Congress. Some may 
argue that this benefit is not justified, but it remains an integral part of the structure of§ 170, 
though sharply limited in some circumstances by§ 170(e) enacted under the Tax Reform Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. See supra note 109. 
The opinion indicated that Grossman was able to pay a price less than fair market value 
because he was a trustee, a member of the Grossman family group, ''was active in the market for 
unwanted industrial properties," 32 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) at 1019, and "the price agreed 
upon by [him] reflected the desire of the seller to dispose of vacant real estate heavily burdened by 
local taxes, and accordingly, such price may not have accurately reflected the fair market value of 
the property at the time." Id at 1018. 
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III. Defining Replacement Value and Liquidation Value 
A. Guidelines for a .Definition of Replacement Value 
When it is determined that replacement value is the appropriate 
test for fair market valuation, one must decide how to determine that 
value. Theoretically, a separate determination should be made for 
each taxpayer, and that determination should depend on the particular 
market to which the taxpayer has access for purchasing the property. 165 
Such determinations, however, are very difficult to make in the 
context of property valuation. One taxpayer may have access to the 
retail market only. A similarly situated taxpayer, however, may have a 
friend or relative in the business who can obtain the property for less 
than the retail price. Moreover, retail prices may vary considerably 
with the location of the purchase. The determination of replacement 
value, therefore, may present insurmountable administrative problems 
if the goal is precise, equitable valuations. The traditional test of fair 
market value refers to generalized willing buyers and willing sellers 
who deal in an open market. This test seems to reject any subjective 
determination for individual cases. Yet, there are several types of 
property for which there is no single market clearing price. This prob-
lem can be solved by establishing presumptions for valuation, depar-
ture from which should be allowed only in limited circumstances. 
A determination of replacement value generally should begin with 
retail value. Retail value represents the price that a retail dealer would 
normally charge for similar property. 166 The retail price rule should 
apply to used property as well as to new property. (Used property mar-
kets have developed among retailers for many kinds of property. 167) 
The retail price rule should also apply to the transaction regardless of 
whether the transferor is a dealer. Retail price should be viewed as the 
price generally charged to customers by the party from whom the tax-
payer receives the property if the property is generally sold by that 
party in the ordinary course of business. In situations in which the 
165. For example, a taxpayer who receives property as compensation for services should in-
clude in income the amount that he would have had to pay for that item in markets to which he 
had access. Similarly, the estate of a decedent should value property included in the estate at the 
amount the ultimate beneficiary of the property would pay in the market to which he has access. 
166. See generally Anthoine, supra note 150, at 277. C.f. Rev. Rul. 80-322, 1980-2 C.B. 36. 
167. If the valuation involves a used automobile, for example, its replacement value should be 
the retail price a dealer would charge for the car. A starting point for determining the price is the 
National Automobile Dealers Association's Bluebook. The price listed in this manual should be 
adjusted for the condition of the automobile. See Clemons v. Commissioner, 38 TAX Cr. MEM. 
DEc. (CCH) 1071 (1979). See also Faw v. Commissioner, 41 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 717 
(1981) (involving use of the National Automobile Dealers' Association Official Used Car Guide 
for determination of fair market value). 
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transferor i~ not a dealer, a plausible argument can be made for using 
the price paid by the transferor as long as the property was purchased 
recently, although some theoretical tidiness would be sacrificed. 
Retail price should represent the lowest price at which the item is 
commercially obtainable by the general public in the geographic area. 
Variation in prices results in part from the various services offered by 
retail stores. Department store services may include assistance in se-
lecting the product or model, convenience, delivery, gift wrapping, 
credit sales, warranties, and even a pleasant atmosphere. None of these 
services, with the possible exception of warranties, affects the value of 
the product itself. The difficulty with using the lowest commercial 
price, however, lies in distinguishing actual market prices from strategi-
cally discounted prices. 
Valuation of property for which there is no dealer market presents 
special problems. These items should be valued on the basis of compa-
rable property that has been sold through privately negotiated sales. 
Real estate, for example, should be valued through comparison with 
recent sales of similar property. In these transactions, replacement 
value and liquidation value will differ only in the sales commission 
generally charged for the transaction. Thus, the commission should be 
included only for determining replacement value, not liquidation 
value. 
The determination of replacement value generally should follow 
the lowest commercially available retail price for the property under 
consideration. Valuation of unique property should track comparable 
private transactions within a reasonable time period. These general 
presumptions should exist for all valuation using the replacement value 
standard unless the taxpayer proves circumstances warrant a different 
value. 168 
168. The Treasury Department during the Carter administration attempted to deal with the 
valuation problem in the context of fringe benefits in another way. The discussion draft of pro-
posed regulations, see supra note 28, enumerated three objective factors to be used in determining 
replacement value: 
( 1) Conditions and restrictions placed on the purchase or use of the item. 
(2) The price charged for the item or its use to customers who are not employees, 
independent contractors or otherwise providing services to the employer. 
(3) Whether an equivalent item or its use is ordinarily purchased by the general 
public on an arm's length basis and, if so, at what price. 
Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.61-20 (discussion draft). The proposed regulations also indicated that those 
factors were not exclusive. 
The examples set forth in the discussion draft generally assume that a retail price will be used 
for valuation and that that price can be established. The draft then states, however, that such a 
price would be a "relevant factor" in determining the amount of inclusion resulting from the 
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B. Guidelines for a Definition of Liquidation Value 
When it is determined that liquidation value is the appropriate test 
for fair market valuation, one faces the problem of measurement once 
again. Liquidation value should depend on the sales proceeds that a 
taxpayer could have obtained had he sold the property. The liquida-
tion value of property held by a taxpayer who is not a dealer generally 
should be based on used property values, since the taxpayer could sell 
it only in the used property market. 169 This market should be the rele-
vant one regardless of whether the taxpayer had in fact used the 
property. 
A subjective test for determining liquidation value presents all of 
the administrative problems associated with replacement valuation. 
Presumptions similar to those proposed for replacement value should 
be created for determining liquidation value. Property normally sold 
by retail dealers should have a liquidation value equal to the wholesale 
price of the property. The wholesale price represents the price nor-
mally paid by a dealer who purchases with the intention of selling the 
property. 170 On the other hand, property generally sold only through 
negotiated private sales should be valued on the basis of comparable 
sales.171 As noted previously, liquidation value and replacement value 
for unique property will differ only in the amount of the sales commis-
sion necessary to complete the transaction. Liquidation value should 
not include the sales commission. 
The determination of liquidation value also involves new consid-
erations. The relevant market, its location, and the comparability of 
goods, all must be part of the decision. However, the wholesale market 
value presumption adds objectivity to this subjective valuation where a 
comparable marketplace exists. The burden of justifying a deviation 
from the presumption should be placed on the taxpayer, who has access 
to the information necessary to make a satisfactory valuation. 
receipt of the benefit. ld The draft implicitly recognizes, therefore, that some horse trading over 
valuation will continue but in all likelihood will involve small amounts. 
The discussion draft would also exclude from income certain items, such as employer product 
discounts under cenain circumstances, for reasons of administrative convenience. It is unclear 
whether the draft would consider the recipient's access to a wholesale market to be a "relevant 
factor'' to be taken into account in determining value. Thus the discussion draft fails to deal 
completely with the problem of valuation. 
169. As a result of the limitations imposed on charitable contribution deductions under the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, valuing new propeny in the hands of a 
dealer is not a practical problem since dealers would not be entitled to a deduction of the value of 
the propeny anyway. See supra note 109. 
170. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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C. Addressing the Problem of Blockage 
One issue frequently arising with respect to valuation is the con-
cept of blockage-valuation of a large number of units of a particular 
item that may decrease the per unit value of the property. 172 The 
blockage phenomenon occurs because the market for certain property 
becomes depressed if the full number of units is placed on the mar-
ket.173 Estate and gift tax regulations permit consideration of the 
blockage effect for valuation purposes and provide in part: 
In certain exceptional cases, the size of the block of stock to be 
valued in relation to the number of shares changing hands in 
sales may be relevant in determining whether selling prices re-
flect the fair market value of the block of stock to be valued. If 
the executor can show that the block of stock to be valued is so 
large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it 
could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing 
the market, the price at which the block could be sold as such 
outside the usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a 
more accurate indication of value than market quotations. 174 
Blockage has generally been viewed as arising from the seller's dif-
ficulty in disposing of all of the units at the per unit market price. 
Blockage, however, need not be viewed in terms of liquidation value 
but rather may be viewed in terms of replacement value as well. If all 
of the seller's units are placed on the market at one time, a purchaser 
may end up paying less than the normal per unit market price because 
of the excess supply of units. 
A closely related issue to blockage is control premium for corpo-
rate stock. The regulations provide that "the degree of control of the 
business represented by the block of stock to be valued" is a relevant 
factor in valuation. 175 A block of stock representing fifty-five percent 
of the outstanding stock of a corporation, for example, may be worth 
more than twice as much as a block representing 27.5 percent because 
172. See generally Barrett, Valuation of Stocks by the Blockage Rule, 29 TAXES 465 (1951); 
Holzman, The "Blockage" Rule, 46 TAXES 292 (1968); Peters, Fair Markel Value of Blocks of 
Stock, 17 TAXES 17 (1939). See also Watts, supra note 65, at 68-97. 
173. See, e.g., Amerda Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 75-
702, 75 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9480 (3d Cir. 1975) (Hunter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Estate ofKopperman v. Commissioner, 37 TAX CT. MEM. 
DEc. (CCH) 1849-24 (1978). 
The relevance of blockage in the valuation of securities is a question of fact. Richardson v. 
Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 34 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 132, 45 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,225 (2d Cir. 
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946). 
174. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-2(e), T.D. 6826, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, T.D. 
7327, 1974-2 C.B. 294, T.D. 7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264. 
175. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-2(f), T.D. 6826, 1958-2 C.B. 432, T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, T.D. 
7327, 1974-2 C.B. 294, T.D. 7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264. 
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the larger block may represent a controlling interest in the corporation 
whereas the smaller block may not. 
The real issue in the blockage and control premium concepts is 
whether each unit should be viewed as a separate piece of property to 
be valued individually, or whether multiple units of the same type of 
property should be viewed in the aggregate as a single item of property. 
Corporate stock generally should be valued in blocks, as a single item 
of property representing a percentage share of ownership of the entire 
corporation. 176 Similar principles should be applied to sufficiently sim-
ilar items of tangible personal property so that the appropriate discount 
is made for blockage. Although an exhaustive treatment of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it appears that the problems of block-
age and control premium are best solved by approaching them as 
problems of valuing a single item of unique property rather than multi-
ple items. 
IV. Conclusion 
This Article proposes that the determination of fair market value 
should depend upon the context of the transaction in which the deter-
mination is made. The variant valuation approach is based upon two 
general principles that look to the ownership of the property at the time 
of valuation to determine whether replacement value or liquidation 
value should be utilized in the ultimate determination: 
(1) Replacement value is generally the proper method of valua-
tion when the taxpayer (or his estate or beneficiary) retains the 
property after the transaction that gives rise to the need for 
valuation. 
(2) Liquidation value is the proper measure of valuation when 
the taxpayer (or his estate or beneficiary) does not retain the 
property. 
176. Recent litigation in this area has centered upon the situation in which a decedent owns 
one portion of the controlling stock and a related party owns the other, where neither party alone 
owned a controlling interest. The Fifth Circuit in Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 
48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 148,487, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) (5th Cir., 1981), ~ 13,436 affg the trial 
court and vacating panel decision, 619 F.2d 407, 46 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 148,407, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 13,359 (5th Cir. 1980), held that valuation of the 27.5% block must be made without 
taking into account the 27.5% block owned by related parties that, together with decedent's shares, 
would constitute control. Similarly, the Tax Court in Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860, 
874 (1978), non acq. 1980-1 C.B. 3, viewed stock owned by a decedent, which was part of a con-
trolling interest owned by both her and her husband as community property, as a minority inter-
est, and gave no effect to its constituting, together with stock owned by the husband, part of a 
controlling interest. See also Popstra v. United States,- F.2d -,50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 148,213 
(9th Cir. 1982); Sundquist v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 74-6337, 74-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 13,035 (E.D. Wash. 1974), supplemental opinion disposing of other issues, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 
(P-H) ~ 147,976 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (cited by the Tax Court in Estate of Lee). 
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The application of this test to a series of hypothetical cash transactions 
shows that for purposes of income tax inclusion, business deductions, 
and estate and gift taxation, fair market value generally should be de-
fmed as replacement value. For purposes of casualty losses and chari-
table contribution deductions, on the other hand, fair market value 
generally should be defmed as liquidation value. 
In 1981, Congress enacted section 6659, which provides a new pen-
alty for income tax "valuation overstatements."177 The penalty may be 
imposed in cases in which the taxpayer claims a value of property that 
is 150% or more of its correct amount on a tax retum. 178 Although 
there are several exceptions to the overvaluation penalty, 179 the new 
provision is designed to dissuade aggressive taxpayers from overstating 
the value of property. It provides a risk greater than mere disallowance 
of that portion of the deduction attributable to the overvaluation.180 
Since penalties, unlike interest on unpaid taxes, are not deducti-
ble, 181 the in terrorem effect of section 6659 may be quite substantial. 
In practice, however, the penalty may very well be waived in all but the 
most egregious cases because the taxpayer can avoid the penalty if he 
has a reasonable basis for the valuation.182 Although the new section 
changes the risks involved in valuation for the purposes of a deduction, 
the underlying legal issue remains unresolved. 
Nevertheless, the variant valuation approach, coupled with the 
new penalty, provides the Service with a powerful weapon, particularly 
against charitable contribution abuse. It creates also a substantial dis-
incentive to overvaluation through the replacement value standard. 
The variant valuation approach to determining fair market value 
provides rules largely consistent with existing tax law. Courts should 
adopt the proposed approach because it furthers the policies underlying 
each area of the tax law. Application of the proposed approach pro-
vides a consistent and equitable approach to fair market valuation for 
all taxpayers. 
177. I.R.C. § 6659 (West Supp. V 1981). 
178. I.R.C. § 66S9(b) (West Supp. V 1981). 
179. I.R.C. § 66S9(d) (West Supp. V 1981). 
180. I.R.C. § 66S9(b) (West Supp. V 1981). 
181. I.R.C. § 162(f) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(l)(ii), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51, T.D. 
7366, 1975-2 C.B. 64. 
182. The statute itself grants the Internal Revenue Service discretionary power to waive the 
penalty in such situations. I.R.C. § 66S9(e) (West Supp. V 1981). 
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